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THE CHANGING FAMILY AND THE CHILD'S BEST
INTERESTS: CURRENT STANDARDS DISCRIMINATE
AGAINST SINGLE WORKING MOTHERS IN CALIFORNIA
CUSTODY MODIFICATION CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Following a divorce in California, custody is awarded to the
parent who can provide the more suitable home.' The court decides
the custody issue based on "the best interests of the child."' The
standard is sex-neutral; neither parent is to be preferred on the basis
of sex.' Under this standard, the courts have broad discretion to de-
cide which parent can provide the better environment for the child."
However, custody is to be awarded in light of the recognition that a
child's established environment should not be changed unnecessa-
rily.' This standard also applies in custody modification cases.
Judges look to various factors to determine the best interests of
the child in these cases. One major consideration is economics: judges
often award custody to. the parent who can supply the highest degree
of financial security for the family.7 Another important consideration
is the availability of a female caretaker in the home.' However, cur-
rent research demonstrates that these factors may not address the
basic needs of young children.9 Research on child development has
established that the most important requirement for a child's emo-
tional well-being is a continuing and nurturing relationship with a
0 1986 by Charles N. Trudrung-Taylor
1. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600 (West 1983). See, e.g., Taber v. Taber, 209 Cal. 755, 290 P.
36 (1930).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (West 1983).
3. See infra note 32.
4. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608 (West 1983). See Gudelj v. Gudelj, 41 Cal. 2d 202, 259 P.2d
656 (1953).
5. In re Marriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730-31, 598 P.2d 36, 38, 157 Cal. Rptr.
383, 385 (1979).
6. Id.
7. See Burchard v. Garay, 2 Civ. 66559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), hearing granted, L.A.
31957 (Cal. Aug. 29, 1984); Gould v. Gould, 116 Wis. 2d 493, 342 N.W.2d 426 (1984) (trial
court changed custody of child from mother to father based on economics and more traditional
lifestyle).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 158-62.
9. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
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primary caretaker.10 Research also shows that constant availability
of the primary caretaker is not necessary to establish this
relationship."
Reliance on economic factors puts single mothers with custody
in an inferior position. Most single mothers must work to support
themselves and their children." Many women do not have the skills
needed to qualify for well paying jobs, 8 so these mothers must sup-
port their families on a very low income.1 4 They must also rely on
day-care facilities while they are at work." Therefore, although they
may provide their children with a healthy and loving environment,
the father may prevail in a custody modification action because he
earns more money than the mother. 6 In addition, the father can ar-
gue that the mother is not providing an adequate home because the
children are in day care while she is working. This argument is par-
ticularly effective when the father has remarried.'
7
Moreover, statistics show that the structure of the American
family is changing. The traditional family, in which the father works
and the mother stays home and cares for the children, no longer ex-
emplifies the majority of families."8 In most families, both parents
work and most married women with children are currently work-
ing." The divorce rate in California is high and continuing to
climb." In addition, approximately one in five families are headed
10. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
13. WOMEN'S BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN
No. 298, TIME OF CHANGE: 1983 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS 24-26 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as WOMEN'S BUREAU No. 2981.
14. Id.; BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 107, FAMILIES MAINTAINED BY FEMALE HOUSEHOLDERS 1970-
1979, at 33-34 (Oct. 1980) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF CENSUS No. 107].
15. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COM-
MERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 129, CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS OF WORKING MOTHERS: JUNE
1982, at 2-8 (Nov. 1983) [hereinafter cited as BUREAU OF CENSUS No. 1291; WOMEN'S BU-
REAU No. 298, supra note 13, at 22.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 156-60.
18. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, SERIES P-23, No. 117, TRENDS IN CHILD CARE ARRANGEMENTS OF WORKING
MOTHERS 1 (June 1982) ("Future generations may someday describe the 'traditional' Ameri-
can family of the 1980's as one where both the husband and wife are employed and their
young children are cared for by a nonfamily member while the mother and father are at
work.").
19. See infra text accompanying notes 74-84.
20. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Prop-




In California, the best interests of the child standard does not
provide judges in custody modification cases with effective guidelines
to help them decide which parent can provide the better care. 2 In
addition, cases indicate that the guidelines which have been adopted
are inadequate.23 Therefore, judges may use any factors they deem
relevant to determine the best interests of the child. Their decisions
often rest on financial status and constant availability of a female
caretaker in the home.24 Decisions founded on these factors do not
recognize the real needs of the children for love and nurturance from
a bonding parent who has been the primary caretaker. Moreover,
decisions based on these factors produce unfair results and do not
achieve the best interests of the children.
This comment addresses the lack of guidelines in the current
best interests of the child standard. Section II of this comment exam-
ines the development of California law in custody modification ac-
tions. Current research on children's needs, the changing nature of
the modern family, and the impact of child care on child develop-
ment will be examined in section III. The problems that are created
by an indeterminate standard will be analyzed in section IV of this
comment. Burchard v. Garay,"8 an unpublished 1984 decision, will
be used to illustrate those problems. Finally, section V of this com-
ment offers three proposals that will limit judicial discretion and en-
sure that custody modification decisions are made in the best inter-
ests of the child. In addition, this comment makes practical
suggestions for attorneys who litigate these cases.
II. MODIFICATION OF CUSTODY: THE STANDARDS USED
Until 1969, California custody cases were governed by laws that
had not changed significantly for over one hundred years.28 In 1969
the Legislature enacted the Family Law Act27 to update these laws.
HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH AND WELFARE AGENCY, STATE OF CAL., VITAL STATISTICS OF
CAL. 10 (Nov. 1983) (140,473 dissolutions of marriage in California in 1981).
21. WOMEN'S BUREAU No. 298, supra note 13, at 3.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 59-71.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 66-71.
24. Scott v. Superior Court, 1,56 Cal. App. 3d 577, 202 Cal. Rptr. 920 (1984).
25. 2 Civ. 66559 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), hearing granted, L.A. 31957 (Cal. Aug. 29,
1984).
26. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON ASSEMBLY BILL No. 530 and SENATE BILL No. 252
(THE FAMILY ACT), 4 ASSEMBLY J. 8053, 8054 (Reg. Sess. 1970) (hereinafter cited as As-
SEMBLY COMM. REPORT].
27. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5188 (West 1983).
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The Family Law Act reflects the Legislature's intent to give
greater recognition to current behavioral science research28 and to
reduce acrimonious litigation by eliminating the issue of fault in
family law proceedings."' The Legislature also sought to strengthen
family unity and to encourage the financial support of family
members.80
California custody modification cases are currently controlled by
the Family Law Act which is embodied in the California Civil Code.
Under subsection 4600(a), 1 a parent may seek to modify the origi-
nal custody order at any time during the child's minority. Subsection
4600(b)8 provides that custody must be awarded according to "the
best interests of the child" and that neither parent is to be preferred
as custodian on the basis of sex. Section 4608" provides that the
court must consider the child's "welfare" in making a determination
of the child's best interests.
Case law in California requires that a parent must show
"changed circumstances" before the custody of a child may be reliti-
gated between natural parents .4 Once a sufficient change of circum-
stances has been established, the court must determine if a change in
28. Krom, California's Divorce Law Reform: An Historical Analysis, 1 PAC. L.J. 156,
156-57 (1970).
29. Id.
30. Scott, 156 Cal. App. 3d at 583, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 921.
31. Subsection 4600(a) provides in pertinent part:
In any proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child, the court
may, during the pendency of the proceeding or any time thereafter, make such
an order for the custody of the child during minority as may seem necessary and
proper. If a child is of suficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an
intelligent preference as to custody, the court shall consider-and give due weight
to the wishes of the child in making an award of custody or modification
thereof.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983).
32. Subsection 4600(b) provides in pertinent part:
Custody should be awarded in the following order of preference according to the
best interests of the child: (1) To both parents jointly pursuant to Section 4600.5
or to either parent. In making an order for custody to either parent, the court
shall consider, among other factors, which parent is more likely to allow the
child or children frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent,
and shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent's sex.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600(b) (West 1983).
33. Section 4608 provides:
In making a determination of the best interest of the child in any proceeding
under this title, the court's determination shall include, but shall not be limited
to, consideration of the health, safety, and welfare of the child.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4608 (West 1983).
34. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385; Goto v. Goto, 52
Cal. 2d 118, 338 P.2d 450 (1959).
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custody is in the child's best interest." Thus, a parent must meet a
two-step test when seeking to modify an existing custody
arrangement.
A. Change of Circumstances Rule
In order to justify modifying custody, there must be a showing
of "changed circumstances" that affect the welfare of the child."
The change in circumstances must substantially affect the child so
that it is "essential or expedient for the welfare of the child that
there be a change." 7 The parent seeking the modification has the
burden to show that the change in circumstances is sufficiently im-
portant to justify a change in custody."8
Two policy considerations were established that underlie the
change of circumstances requirement. There should be an end of liti-
gation for the sake of the child's emotional stability." The child's
established lifestyle should not be changed in order to protect that
stability.40
In In re Marriage of Carney,41 the California Supreme Court
reaffirmed the change of circumstances rule that was originally
adopted in Connolly v. Connolly." The court also established two
policy considerations to limit the discretion of judges in all change of
custody cases. The court stated that it was "undesirable" to change
the child's "established mode of living" after a significant period of
35. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr at 385.
36. Id.
37. Id. (quoting Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588, 122 P.2d 96, 102
(1942)).
38. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
39. Id. at 730-31, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
40. Id.
41. 24 Cal. 3d 725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1979). In Carney, the parents
separated but did not divorce. They agreed that the father would have custody of their two
sons. Five years later, the father was injured in a jeep accident, and became quadriplegic.
Although she had not seen the children since she and the father had separated, the mother
sought custody of her two sons in a dissolution of marriage proceeding. The court determined
that the father's physical condition would have a negative effect on the best interests of the
children, and awarded custody to the mother. Id. at 729, 598 P.2d at 37, 157 Cal. Rptr. at
384. The trial court found that the father's disability was sufficient to establish a change of
circumstances because it would prevent him from having a "normal" relationship with his
children. Id. at 735, 598 P.2d at 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
The California Supreme Court reversed the decision because it was based on "outdated"
stereotypes and stated that the trial court failed to determine if the father's handicap would "in
fact" have a negative effect on the children. The supreme court found that the trial court had
abused its discretion by basing its decision on the father's inability to participate in sporting
activities with his sons. Id. at 736, 598 P.2d at 38, 42, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 389.
42. 214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1963).
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time in one parent's home no matter how custody was first deter-
mined.48 The court also found that it was "desirable that there be an
end of litigation. 1 The Carney court found that while judges have
broad discretion in deciding custody cases, the judge's decision must
be made in light of these important policy considerations when a
complete change in custody is involved.4 The court also noted that
appellate courts often had to reverse decisions that were not guided
by those policies."
Following Carney, some trial courts ignored these guidelines.
For instance, in Speelman v. Superior Court,41 the mother sought to
gain physical custody of her five year old son. The trial court never
addressed the issue of changed circumstances and determined that it
was in the best interests of the child to live with his mother. The
judge stated that although he did not find that the child's home with
the father and stepmother was unnurturing, he preferred the
mother's "less rigid" home and was not in favor a "military up-
bringing for a child."'48 The appellate court reversed because the
trial court's decision to change custody without finding changed cir-
cumstances violated the Carney rule."'
In Burchard, the father of a three-year-old boy sought to gain
custody of his son. The parents of the child dated infrequently and
had never married. The mother informed the father that she was
pregnant, but the father denied paternity and suggested that she get
an abortion. After the child was born, the mother brought a pater-
nity action against the father. A blood examination indicated that he
was the father of the child, and he stipulated to paternity."0 The
court awarded child support to the mother."1
The father saw his son for the first time when the child was
fifteen months old. The father then moved in with the mother and
child for six weeks, but the relationship failed. Three months later,
the father married a woman to whom he had been engaged before he
43. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 731 n.4, 598 P.2d at 38 n.4, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385 n.4.
44. Id. at 730-31, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (quoting Connolly v. Connolly,
214 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436, 29 Cal. Rptr. 616, 619 (1963)).
45. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 740-41, 598 P.2d at 44-45, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92.
46. Id. at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
47. 152 Cal. App. 3d 124, 199 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1983).
48. Id. at 127, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
49. Id. at 133, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
50. Appellant's Opening Brief at 2-3, Burchard v. Garay, 2 Civ. 66559 (Cal. Ct. App.),
hearing granted, L.A. 31957 (Cal. Aug. 29, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Appellant's Opening
Brief].
51. Appellant's Reply Brief at 3, Burchard v. Garay, 2 Civ. 66559 (Cal. Ct. App.),
hearing granted, L.A. 31957 (Cal. Aug. 29, 1984).
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moved in with the mother, and he then sought custody of the child.
Before the trial, the child had resided solely with the mother except
for the six week period when the father lived with them. "2
The trial court did not require a change of circumstances and
awarded custody to the father based on the best interests of the
child." The appellate court unanimously affirmed the trial court's
decision noting that "in the continuum of life conditions are con-
stantly changing."'" The court indicated that several significant
changes in circumstances had occurred, any one of which might have
met the changed circumstances requirement. These changes included:
the failure of the parent's cohabitation, the stipulation of the father's
paternity, the father's remarriage, the mother's attempt to improve
herself and seek a career by attending nursing school, and the
mother's decision to hold two jobs." Neither the trial court nor the
appellate court found any likelihood of present or future harm to the
child if he were to stay with the mother. Such harm might have
made the change in custody essential or expedient to the child's wel-
fare. In consideration of the effects of a change in custody on the
child, the court noted:
[T]he potential trauma to a child inherent in any change of
physical custody,. . . creates an obstacle that the party seeking
the change must surmount. Nevertheless, this fact does not, per
se, require a "change of circumstances," for if it did no father
could ever hope to be awarded custody of a child born out of
wedlock of originally uncertain parentage for nature pays no
regard to Civil Code section 4600, and always awards initial
custody to the mother."
The court stated that the change of circumstances rule did
not apply here because the rule was designed to prevent re-
peated litigation of an issue that had already been decided, and
that was not the case here.57
The change of circumstances rule was established to add
substance to the best interests standard by limiting judicial dis-
cretion in custody modification cases." Under the Carney rule,
once a change of circumstances is found, the court must deter-
52. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 50, at 2-3.
53. Burchard v. Garay, No. EAD 64669, slip op. at 1-3 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 18,
1984).
54. Burchard v. Garay, 2 Civ. 66559, slip op. at 6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 18, 1984).
55. Id.
56. Id. slip op. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
57. Id. slip op. at 5.
58. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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mine whether modifying the current custody arrangement serves
the best interests of the child.
B. Best Interests of the Child Standard
1. Background
In the late nineteenth century, the California Legislature estab-
lished the best interest of the child standard to protect the child's
welfare; all other interests were made subordinate to the child's
needs." At the same time, the Legislature established a "tender
years" presumption to guide custody awards. The tender years pre-
sumption stated that "if the child is of tender years it should be given
to the mother."'6 The best interests of the child standard and the
tender years presumption were contained in section 246 of the Civil
Code. 1 This presumption was based on the widely held notion that
young children thrived best under the constant care of the mother.
62
The presumption, thus, expressed the Legislature's view that the
child's best interests were fulfilled when the mother was awarded
custody. The presumption also limited the judge's discretion in cus-
tody awards.
In the last twenty years, the tender years presumption has been
criticized. Critics charged that the standard reflected an outdated
view of women." The presumption was also criticized as discrimina-
tory against fathers. 4 In 1972, the Legislature responded to these
59. CAL. CIV. CODE § 246 (1872).
60. Civil Code section 246 provides in pertinent part:
In awarding the custody of a minor, or in appointing a general guardian,
the Court or officer is to be guided by the following considerations:
1. By what appears to be in the best interest of the child in respect to its
temporal and its mental and moral welfare; and if the child is of a significant
age to form an intelligent preference, the Court may consider that preference in
determining the question.
2. As between parents adversely claiming the custody or guardianship,
neither parent is entitled to it as of right, but, other things being equal, if the
child is of tender years it should be given to the mother; if it is of an age to
require education and preparation for labor or business, then to the father.
Id.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Washburn, 49 Cal. App. at 584, 122 P.2d at 100.
63. Final Report of the California Assembly Interim Committee on Judiciary, 23 As-
SEMBLY INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORTS No. 6 at 161 (1965) [hereinafter cited as INTERIM
COMMITTEE REPORT); THE REPORT OF THE CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
THE FAMILY 39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT]. Former
Governor Edmund G. Brown formed the commission to investigate the high rate of divorce
and its often devastating consequences on the family. Krom, supra note 28, at 163-70.
64. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63 at 39; Fain, Our Children -
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critics, and repealed the tender years presumption.6" The Legislature
found that because of the changing role of women in society and the
discriminatory impact on fathers, the presumption should be
abolished.
2. Current Standard
Although the Legislature abolished the tender years presump-
tion, it preserved the best interests of the child standard. The current
standard contains no presumption on which judges can rely in mak-
ing custody determinations. The standard is sex-neutral: it provides
that neither parent is to be preferred as the custodial parent on the
basis of sex."
Under the current standard, trial judges have broad discretion
to determine the meaning of the best interests rule. California Civil
Code section 4608 states that the judge must consider the child's wel-
fare when determining the child's best interests. However, the statute
prescribes that the court may consider other unspecified factors in
addition to the child's best interests. 67 The decision of the trial judge
will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion.6"
Courts use many different factors to determine the best interests
of the child. After the tender years presumption was repealed, eco-
nomic factors such as job stability, home ownership, and a more af-
fluent lifestyle have been used to the determine the child's best inter-
ests in custody modification cases."' A lifestyle preference based on
the presence of a nonworking stepmother and a traditional home en-
vironment have also been used.70
For instance, in Burchard, the trial judge found both economic
factors and the father's traditional home environment persuasive.
The judge noted the father owned his own home, and that he had
held the same job for five years. The court also noted that the father
and stepmother could provide constant care without the use of care-
takers, and that the father and stepmother had more relatives who
lived in the area than did the mother.7 1
Citizens of Tomorrow, 1963-65 A.B.A. SEc. OF FAMILY PROc. 27, 30-31.
65. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983) (repealing statutory preference for maternal
custody of young children in 1972).
66. Id. See supra note 32.
67. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608 (West 1983).
68. Marriage of Russo, 21 Cal. App. 3d 72, 86, 98 Cal. Rptr. 501, 511 (1971).
69. See infra text accompanying notes 153-55.
70. See infra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
71. Burchard, No. EAD 64669, slip op. at 1-3.
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In the past, the child's interests were believed to be best served
by awarding custody to the mother. California abandoned sex-role
preferences in recognition of the changing roles of women in society.
Trial judges, however, have continued to modify custody arrange-
ments based on traditional notions of the child's need for constant
care by a female caretaker. Due to the sharp increase in the number
of working mothers and their reliance on child care services, this
comment next examines the current data on the caretaking needs of
children.
III. CURRENT DATA ON CARETAKING NEEDS OF CHILDREN
AND THEIR PRIMARY CARETAKERS
A. The Changing Family
The traditional nuclear family was composed of a father, a
mother and the children. Typically, the father was the sole wage-
earner, and the wife stayed home to take care of the children.7" This
traditional model has begun to change.
7 8
Since 1950, the number of mothers in the job market has in-
creased three hundred percent.7 ' This increase has been caused al-
most exclusively by the influx of married women into the job market.
The greatest increase has occurred among mothers with preschool
age children.7 Thus, the number of families in which both parents
work now exceeds the number of families with only one wage
earner.7 The increasing number of families with two working par-
ents represents one of the most significant socio-economic develop-
ments of the 1970's.77 Currently, the wife works at least part time in
more than fifty percent of the two-parent families in the United
States. 8 Married women with children between the ages of six and
seventeen were the most likely out of all married women to be work-
ing in 1981.79 In addition, forty-nine percent of married women with
preschool age children are also working.80 Thus, mothers are more
likely to work now than at any other time in United States history.8
72. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. WOMEN'S BUREAU No. 298, supra note 13, at 17.
75. id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 16-17.
78. Id. (68% of families with children under 18 had two working parents in 1978).





The number of single mothers maintaining families rose seventy
percent between 1970 and 1981." This rise was largely due to the
increased rate of divorce in the United States.8" By 1982, one out of
five families was maintained by a woman. Most of these women had
children under eighteen years of age."'
Single mothers are generally poor, and they often lack both em-
ployment skills and education."5 Many are divorced homemakers
who raised children and did not pursue careers.8 6 Because of their
lack of employment skills, they generally do not qualify for jobs that
pay adequate wages. One survey conducted in 1979 found that sev-
enty-five percent of divorced homemakers made less than $5,000 a
year. 87
The mother must rely on someone to care for her children while
she works. This need for child care caused enrollment in nursery
schools to increase by more than eighty percent from 1970 to 1980."8
This rise occurred even though there was a significant drop in the
number of three and four-year-old children in the population.'
As more parents used child care facilities, a concern grew over
the potential negative impact of an absent mother on the child's emo-
tional well-being. Since mothers had traditionally been constantly
available to provide for their children's needs, many people believed
that the mother's constant availability was necessary."0 Research
conducted in the last fifteen years has led to new knowledge of what
a child needs for healthy emotional development.
B. Requirements for Healthy Emotional Development
Researchers have investigated the needs of children in ensuring
82. Id. at 24.
83. Id. at 15. See also BUREAU OF CENSUS No. 107, supra note 14, at 1.
84. WOMEN'S BUREAU No. 298, supra note 13 at 3, 24.
85. Id. at 25. See BUREAU OF CENSUS No. 107, supra note 14, at 14, 33 (median
income was less than half of the median income of families overall); WOMEN'S BUREAU, OF-
FICE OF THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE EARNINGS GAP BETWEEN MEN AND
WOMEN 1 (1979).
86. WOMEN'S BUREAU No. 298, supra note 13, at 25-26.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 22. See also BUREAU OF CENSUS No. 129, supra note 15, at 1.
89. WOMEN'S BUREAU No. 298, supra note 13, at 22.
90. INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 153-55. See also UNIF. MAR-
RIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-201 (1970) (the tender years presumption was
thought -to be a shorthand way of determining child's best interest). But see RUTTER, MATE-
RIAL DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 15 (1972) (noting that research has often been misinterpreted
to support the notion that mothers must be constantly available and that use of day care is
harmful to children).
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healthy emotional development. They conclude that the quality of
the relationship between the primary caretaker and the child is far
more important to healthy development than the constant availability
of the caretaker. 1 The gender of the primary caretaker is not an
important factor: fathers and mothers are equally capable of provid-
ing quality care. 92 It is necessary that the child form an attachment
bond with a caretaker who can provide a continuous and unbroken
relationship with the child during his or her formative years.9"
The quality of the relationship determines whether bonding
takes place. A mother who plays with her child and is attentive to
the child's needs has a much more strongly attached child than a
mother who provides only routine care. If the father is the more
attentive parent, the child is more likely to become attached to him.
It is the intensity or quality of the care which is crucial in develop-
ing the attachment bond.
94
The continuity of the relationship between the primary care-
taker and the child is also a critical factor in the child's development.
Continuity is established through daily contact over time and should
be distinguished from constant availability.9 Therefore, a mother
who spends part of her day working does not affect the continuity of
the relationship. These findings undermine the belief that a child
needs constant access to the mother."
The increased use of child care by working mothers has led re-
searchers to investigate long term effects of day care on children.
Studies show that children who are cared for by baby sitters or day-
care centers do not develop emotional problems so long as good care
is provided.9 7 Good care means that the child's basic health, safety,
and emotional needs are met. Those children whose needs are not
met because of a long succession of poor caretakers may suffer long-
term consequences.'" These studies found that if good care is pro-
91. RUrrER, supra note 90, at 18 (compilation of current research on the effects of
maternal deprivation).
92. Id. at 125; Modlin, Child Custody: Standards and Considerations in Determining
or Modifying Orders Re Same, 1963-65 A.B.A. SEC. OF FAMILY PROc. 38, 41. But see Klaff,
The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CA.IF. L. REV. 335, 343-48 (1982).
93. Klaff, supra note 92, at 347. J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 31-34 (1973) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN]; RUTTER,
supra note 90, at 18-23.
94. RUTTER, supra note 90, at 18.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 60-61.
98. Id. at 101 ("In a study of working mothers, [one researcher] found that the only
group to suffer were the children who went from 'pillar to post' in a succession of unsatisfac-
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vided, the main drawback to day-care centers is that very young chil-
dren are more likely to contract common childhood illnesses.99
Current research has found that the quality and continuity of
care by a primary caretaker over time is essential to the child's emo-
tional well being and development.1 00 Constant availability of the
primary caretaker is not required to achieve these results. Moreover,
research indicates that the constant availability of the primary care-
taker may actually be detrimental to the child in some cases.10'
A few jurisdictions have recognized the need for an unbroken
relationship between the child and the primary caretaker.10 2 In re-
sponse, these jurisdictions have created a presumption which protects
the relationship.103
C. Primary Caretaker Presumption
Most states have the best interests standard for determining cus-
tody awards.' 0 ' At least two jurisdictions have adopted a primary
caretaker presumption to aid judges in finding what is in the child's
best interests.' 0 ' The primary caretaker presumption assumes that
the parent who has a history of providing for the child's needs will
continue to do so and should be awarded custody. The presumption
also recognizes the child's need for a continuous relationship with
the primary parent.'" An examination of the factors used in juris-
dictions which have adopted a primary caretaker presumption dem-
onstrates how the determination of custody awards is affected when
there is a presumption protecting the relationship of the child and its
primary caretaker.
In Marriage of Handy,0 7 the Oregon Court of Appeals re-
versed a decision by the circuit court which changed physical custody
tory and unstable child-minding arrangements.").
99. Id. at 61-62.
100. Klaff, supra note 92; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 93 (continuity with caretaker should
be the guide in custody disputes); RUTTER, supra note 90, at 18.
101. RUTTER, supra note 90, at 61 (children of mothers who work may be less likely to
become delinquent than those whose mothers don't work).
102. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W.Va. 1981); Gould v. Gould, 116 Wis.
2d 493, 342 N.W.2d 426 (1984); Marriage of Handy, 44 Or. App. 225, 605 P.2d 738 (1980).
103. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d 357; Gould, 116 Wis. 2d 493, 342 N.W.2d 426; Handy,
44 Or. App. 225, 605 P.2d 738.
104. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeter-
minacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS. 226, 236-37 (Summer 1975).
105. Garska, 278 S.E.2d 357; Gould, 116 Wis. 2d 493, 342 N.W.2d 426.
106. Pollikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child
Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 235, 241-43 (1982).
107. 44 Or. App. 225, 605 P.2d 738 (1980).
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of the children from the mother to the father because he was soon to
remarry.' 08 The court of appeals stated that if there were no persua-
sive evidence of harm to the children in their present environment,
the children should remain with the parent who has provided the
primary care of the children.'01
In Garska v. McCoy," ° a West Virginia trial court changed
custody of the child from the mother and primary caretaker to the
putative father based on the father's superior economic position and
education."' The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision,
but acknowledged that when both parents are fit custodians, it is
impossible for a judge to decide who is the better caretaker. 1 The
court found that custody proceedings can have a destructive impact
on the emotional health of the children."' In addition, the court
stated that a primary caretaker may bargain away needed support
payments when faced with the possibility of losing his or her
child." ' To avoid these results, the court held that when the child is
of tender years, custody will be awarded to the parent who has taken
primary responsibility for the care of the children."' The court of
appeals found that economic and educational factors alone "pale in
comparison to love, tolerance, and the willingness to sacrifice."""
The court also noted that the primary caretaker parent has a child-
rearing history to which the court can look to determine his or her
fitness as a parent. If fit, the primary caretaker should continue as
the custodial parent."
7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STANDARDS
In California, the change of circumstances requirement and the
best interests standard do not provide judges in custody modification
cases with guidelines to help them decide which parent can provide
the better care. Currently, judges may use any factors they deem
relevant to determine whether to change an existing custody arrange-
ment. Their decisions often rest on financial status and constant
108. Id. at 227, 605 P.2d at 739-40.
109. Id. at 235-36, 605 P.2d at 742-43.
110. 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
I11. Id. at 359.
112. Id. at 361-62.
113. Id. at 361.
114. Id. at 362.
115. Id.




availability of a female caretaker in the home.11 Decisions founded
on these factors do not recognize the real needs of the children for
love and nurturing from the bonding parent who has been the pri-
mary caretaker. 19 Moreover, decisions based on these factors pro-
duce unfair results and do not achieve the best interests of the
children.
Currently, the courts have not adequately defined the standards
which trial judges should follow when deciding whether a change of
circumstances has occurred.'2 The next section examines the current
change of circumstances rule.
A. Change of Circumstances Rule
The California Supreme Court set out three standards for
judges to follow when determining whether a change of circum-
stances has occurred. First, a trial judge should not find changed
circumstances unless the litigation will have a substantial impact on
the child's welfare. Second, judges should consider the effects of dis-
rupting the child's established homelife. Third, the possible adverse
effects of protracted litigation on the child should be considered.'
However, cases indicate that many trial courts do not follow these
guidelines. Either they do not require a change of circumstances at
all, or they use factors unconnected with the child's welfare to find
the required change. The Carney court noted that trial judges have
broad discretion in deciding custody modification cases. However, the
court recognized the need to limit this discretion."2
In Speelman v. Superior Court,"3 the trial court did not re-
quire any change in circumstances to change the custody of the child.
The case was decided merely on what the judge considered to be in
the child's best interest.12 4
In Burchard, the trial court also neglected to find a change of
circumstances before it changed the custody of the child. On appeal,
the appellate court affirmed and noted that circumstances are con-
stantly changing, and that almost anything could constitute a change
118. See Pollikoff, supra note 106; Woods, Been & Schulman, Sex and Economic Dis-
crimination in Child Custody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1130, 1130-33 (1983).
119. Klaff, supra note 92, at 347 n.71.
120. Mnookin, supra note 104, at 262-68 ("Custody disputes are now decided on broad,
person-oriented principles that ask for highly individualized determinations.").
121. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 730-31, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
122. Id.
123. 152 Cal. App. 3d 124, 199 Cal. Rptr. 784 (1983).
124. Id. at 126-28, 199 Cal Rptr. at 785-86.
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in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in custody.125 The
court reasoned that the change of circumstances rule was designed to
prevent repeated litigation arising from minor changes in the custo-
dial parent's life. 26
The lack of definition in the standard has several undesirable
consequences. First, although the standard is sex-neutral, the courts
prefer remarried fathers over single working mothers as custodians.
Judges tend to award custody to remarried fathers because there is a
female available who can provide constant care. For instance, in
Burchard, despite the fact that the mother had been the sole care-
taker of the child since its birth, the trial court found that the
mother, father and stepmother were equally bonded with the child.
The court also found that the father and stepmother could provide
constant care for the child without relying on baby sitters.""
Second, because the rule is so vague, custody modification deci-
sions are often overturned for abuse of discretion."" These frequent
reversals demonstrate that the standard fails to provide adequate
guidelines to help judges reach proper decisions. Thus, judges are
able to substitute personal preferences for the limits and policies set
out by the supreme court.1 9 This is illustrated by Speelman, where
the judge decided he liked one environment better than the other.130
The judge did not consider the effect of a change on the child, nor
did he consider the possibility of an extended custody battle. The
judge simply applied his own preference for a less restrictive
lifestyle.
Third, a single working mother faces severe risks if she must
take her case to an appellate court in order to protect her child's
welfare.1 31 A single working mother probably cannot afford to ap-
peal the trial court's decision. Even if she can afford an appeal, the
appellate court may be influenced by the fact that the child has al-
ready experienced one change of environment under the trial court's
decision. The child may also have lived with the father for one or
125. 2 Civ. 66559, slip op. at 6.
126. Id. slip op. at 5.
127. No. EAD 64669, slip op. at 2-3.
128. See, e.g., Speelman, 152 Cal. App. 3d 124, 199 Cal. Rptr. 784; Carney, 24 Cal. 3d
725, 598 P.2d 36, 157 Cal. Rptr. 383; In re Marriage of Kern, 87 Cal. App. 3d 402, 150 Cal.
Rptr. 860 (1978); Denham v. Martina, 214 Cal. App. 2d 312, 29 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1963);
Ashwell v. Ashwell, 135 Cal. App. 2d 211, 286 P.2d 983 (1955); Bemis v. Bemis, 89 Cal.
App. 2d 80, 200 P.2d 84 (1948).
129. See Mnookin, supra note 104, at 263.
130. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 127-28, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 786.
131. See Mnookin, supra note 104, at 262-68.
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two years by the time the appeal is adjudicated. Thus, the court may
hesitate to change the child's environment again."' 2
The standard is also not guaranteed to be adjudicated any more
equitably merely because it is being tried in an appellate court. The
standard is indeterminative, and, therefore, the outcome is
unpredictable.1 3
The Burchard case demonstrates the unpredictability of the
change of circumstances rule. The father suggested that the mother
have an abortion when she told him of her pregnancy. The mother
declined to have an abortion, and the father refused to stipulate to
paternity until fifteen months after the child's birth. Several months
later he married another woman and sued for custody of the child.
He was awarded custody, and the mother appealed.1 3 ' The appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision and did not require a change
of circumstances. The court also noted that the child had been in the
custody of the father for two years, and the court did not want to
disrupt the child's established lifestyle. 3
B. Best Interests of the Child Standard
The standard governing all custody actions in California is the
best interests of the child."' The best interests standard has even
fewer limits than the change of circumstances rule."17 The best inter-
ests standard sets no limits on judges who make custody determina-
tions.38 Commentators and experts in the family law field have
strongly criticized the best interest standard.' 9 One report, prepared
for the California Legislature, found that the best interests standard
was "given more passing mention than real effect."" 4 0 The report
stated that "the standard is too often applied as a mere generaliza-
tion, without real inquiry into whether the disposition actually ful-
fills the child's best interest.""' Another study noted:
Too often these so-called generalizations or cliches are used by
our lawyers and judges with basically no real investigation or
132. See, e.g., Burchard, 2 Civ. 66559, slip op. at 7.
133. Mnookin, supra note 104, at 263.
134. Appellant's Opening Brief, supra note 50, at 2-3.
135. 2 Civ. 66559, slip op. at 7.
136. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1986).
137. Carney, 24 Cal. 3d at 731, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
138. CAL. CiV. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1986).
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thought given to what actually is in the best interests of the
child. Moreover, there are often honest differences of opinion
concerning a fit custodial parent or the best interests of children.
Individual discretion of judgment is not always a sure guide to
custody matters. When one considers the fact that our divorce
judges have a wide and almost uncontrolled discretion in these
matters, the problem is compounded. The exercise of this discre-
tion cannot be considered simply as a legal function, no matter
how learned in the law a judge may be. We must recognize that
the discretion exercised by a trial judge is far less a product of
his learning than of his personality and temperament, his back-
ground and interests, his biases and prejudices, conscious or un-
conscious. Hence, it is both necessary and practicable to attempt
to give more definite substance to the generalizations that creep
into our laws and into our cases.14
The solution proposed by the Interim Committee"' and the
Governor's Commission on the Family1 44 was to increase the use of
child welfare experts to help trial judges make custody determina-
tions. Cases indicate, however, that the use of experts has not curbed
the discretion of the trial judge. 4 5 Moreover, studies reveal that ex-
perts are susceptible to the same biases as are judges. 1 4 Thus, judges
often make determinations based on recommendations from evalu-
ators who share inconsistent views about single mothers and their
ability to provide adequate care for their children. Thus, these deter-
minations do not always reflect the research regarding the child's
best interest.147
Many factors have been used by trial court judges in determin-
ing the best interests of the child. Judges generally rely on two major
factors: economic factors and a traditional lifestyle preference. 48
When economic factors are used in guiding the judge's decision, cus-
tody is determined by examining which parent is more financially
secure and can offer more material benefits to the child. Economic
factors are important in custody determinations because the judge
142. INTERIM COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 63, at 152-53.
143. Id. at 161.
144. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at 41.
145. See supra note 123-39 and accompanying text.
146. Three child welfare professionals, each with at least five years of experience, par-
ticipated in a study where they had to determine whether a child should be removed from its
home. Ninety-four actual cases were used in the study. Out of 94 cases, the experts agreed on
only 45. More importantly, they did not rely on the same factors when they were in agree-
ment. Mnookin, supra note 104, at 263.
147. See supra notes 90-101 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 103-121 and accompanying text.
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must ensure that the custodial parent can provide the child with the
basic necessities of life.' 49 However, the earning power of a single
mother is usually inferior to that of the father.""0 When a judge uses
economic factors to determine which parent will be awarded custody
of the child, the father will have an advantage in most cases.
In Burchard, the trial court found the father was more stable in
his job than the mother and that he was "better equipped economi-
cally" to care for the child. The court also found that the father
owned his own home, where the child would have a "content
environment.' 51
The use of economic factors results in an inadvertent preference
of giving fathers custody in modification cases. This result directly
contradicts the requirement of a sex-neutral standard.
The second major factor applied by courts is a preference for a
traditional lifestyle. 152 Many trial court judges favor custody awards
to the parent who can provide the most traditional lifestyle for the
child. These judges prefer a family structure involving a working
father and a non-working mother which no longer exists in over half
the families in the United States. l"' This attitude fails to recognize
the great increase in families with two working parents, and it also
fails to acknowledge the substantial increase in single parent house-
holds, especially those headed by women.
The preference for a traditional two-parent family is based on
the belief that a "mother's place is in the home" where she can pro-
vide constant care for her children."" If a single mother works and
must rely on day care, the judge may decide that she is not providing
a good home for the child. The judge may also feel that the mother is
subordinating her child's needs to her own.' Thus, when a remar-
ried father seeks a change in custody, the judge may award custody
to the father because he can provide a home with a constant female
caretaker."'
The trial court in Burchard was persuaded by the fact that the
father and stepmother could provide constant care without relying on
149. Assembly Comm. Report, supra note 26, at 8061.
150. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
151. No. EAD 64669, slip op. at 2-3.
152. Pollikoff, supra note 106, at 241.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
154. See, e.g., Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 588, 122 P.2d 96, 100.
155. For instance, one trial court stated that the mother was more interested in being an
attorney than in being a mother. Career or Child? Mom Would Have to Choose, 69 A.B.A. J.
1808 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Career or Child].
156. Burchard, No. EAD 64669, slip op. at 2.
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baby sitters. The appellate court stated that the stepmother's accept-
ance of the child was a significant factor. 157
Further, the traditional lifestyle factor results in a view of
women as "fungible" caretakers. Under this view, any woman, re-
gardless of her relationship with the child, becomes an equally desir-
able caretaker simply because she is female and available. 58 The
fact that the trial court in Burchard found that the child was bonded
equally with the stepmother after a period of only a few months of
visiting the father's home would seem to evince the notion of women
as fungible caretakers.
When judges base custody decisions on a preference for a non-
working mother figure in combination with economic factors, an un-
spoken double standard for single working mothers inadvertently re-
sults. The father's dedication to his work is seen as providing for the
child's best interests, but the mother who works is seen as failing to
provide a good home life."' In addition, the father generally earns
more money, so the mother appears to offer a less desirable home in
this way as well. 60 Thus, the mother who works to provide for the
needs of her children faces a "Catch..22" situation in a custody modi-
fication proceeding. Her dilemma is a direct result of the lack of
limits on judicial discretion.
Most importantly, basing custody modification decisions on a
traditional lifestyle preference and economic factors fails to serve the
best interests of the child as we now understand them. Research
shows that children need quality care from a primary caretaker. The
constant availability of a parent and the presence of a female care-
taker are not necessary. The need for an unbroken relationship is
significant in the child's emotional development."' A new house and
material benefits cannot replace the love and nurturance of the
child's primary caretaker.' 62 A stepmother cannot take the place of a
mother who has been the child's primary caretaker since birth. The
finding by the trial court in Burchard that the stepmother was
equally bonded with the mother despite her limited contact with the
child is controverted by available evidence on child development re-
search. 6 Primary caretakers are not fungible. The continuity of the
157. 2 Civ. 66559, slip op. at 6.
158. Pollikoff, supra note 106, at 241.
159. See Career or Child, supra note 155, at 1808,.
160. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 359.
161. Klaff, supra note 92, at 347 n.71.
162. ASSEMBLY COMM. REPORT, supra note 26, at 8061.
163. RUTTER, supra note 90, at 18-19.
[Vol. 26
CHILD'S BEST INTEREST
relationship with the specific caretaker is significant.
Decisions based on economic and traditional lifestyle factors can
have a damaging effect on the child's welfare. If custody is changed
based on these factors and continuity with the primary caretaker is
broken, the child may suffer emotional damage. This damage may
not be able to be reversed on appeal. 64
These results flow from the broad discretion given trial court
judges in custody modification cases. Neither the change of circum-
stances rule nor the best interests standard provide judges with ade-
quate guidance to make changes in custody decisions.
C. Policy
The basic underlying concern in custody modification cases is
promoting the child's welfare." 5 Views on what is important to the
child's welfare, however, change as society changes. The history of
the laws affecting child custody in California reflects these changes.
The California Legislature has taken different approaches to imple-
ment the policy of protecting the welfare of children. First, the Leg-
islature adopted the tender years presumption because it was be-
lieved that children needed the love and constant care only a mother
could provide. 6 The presumption was in effect for one hundred
years, and during this period, mothers were viewed as the preferred
custodians for young children. 17 Next, the Legislature revamped the
existing divorce laws by adopting the Family Law Act in 1969.88
The Legislature intended to reduce the effects of divorce on children
by using experts to decide difficult custody cases and end acrimoni-
ous litigation. Three years later, the Legislature recognized that the
tender years presumption no longer reflected an accurate view of
women's changing social roles. 19 They also recognized that the pre-
sumption resulted in discrimination against fathers in custody ac-
tions. 170 Thus, in 1972, the Legislature abolished the tender years
presumption and adopted a sex-neutral standard for determining
custody cases.17 ' Next, the California Supreme Court in Carney at-
164. Klaff, supra note 92, at 347.
165. CAL. Civ. CODE § 4608 (West Supp. 1986).
166. CAL. Civ. CODE § 246 (1872).
167. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at 39.
168. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4000-5174 (West Supp. 1983).
169. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600 (West 1983) (repealing statutory preference for maternal
custody of young children in 1972).
170. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at 39.
171. See supra note 169.
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tempted to establish policy factors to guide judges in custody deci-
sions. 17' The Carney court sought to end litigation in custody modifi-
cation cases by requiring that the circumstances render a change in
custody essential or expedient. The court also found that the child's
established lifestyle should not be changed. 73 Thus, both the Legis-
lature and the court recognized the value of certainty and stability
for children.
Cases demonstrate that the policy of ending litigation in change
of custody cases is not being realized.'1 4 The Carney court noted that
reversals of trial court decisions were not uncommon. This is harm-
ful to the child's welfare because the relationship with the primary
caretaker has been broken. Reversals also adversely affect single
working mothers who may litigate custody cases at the appellate
level and then lose because judges do not want to change the child's
environment.
Many judges do not follow the Carney guidelines and use other
factors such as economics and a traditional lifestyle preference to de-
termine custody modification cases.1' However, current research
shows that economic factors and a preference for a traditional lifes-
tyle do not take the child's real developmental needs into account.
There is a genuine need to provide substantive guidelines for
judges. 17 Without such guidelines, the policies articulated by the
Legislature and in Carney cannot be implemented. These guidelines
should be based on current behavioral science research and should
ensure that trial courts take account of the child's need for a stable
relationship with the primary caretaker parent. The changing struc-
ture of the family must also be recognized, so that judges can evalu-
ate the family situations of litigants in a more realistic light.
In addition, proper guidelines will reduce the trend toward the
father preference in custody modification actions. This will provide a
more equitable result for single working mothers. Better substantive
guidelines in custody modification cases would also make determina-
tions more predictable. If parents can predict the outcome of custody
awards, acrimonious litigation might be reduced. 177 This would al-
low the family a better opportunity to adjust to its new lifestyle.
Thus, the stability of the child will be protected and cooperation be-
172. 24 Cal. 3d at 730-31, 598 P.2d at 39, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86.
173. Id. at 730-31 598 P2d. at 38. 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
174. See supra note 128.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 122-35.




tween parents will be more likely.178
V. PROPOSALS
A. Require A Showing of Harm to Meet the Change of Circum-
stances Requirement
In order to protect the child's best interests and- promote the
policy objectives of the California Legislature, an extraordinary
change in circumstances should be required before a change in cus-
tody from one natural parent to the other can be made. Speculative
harm should not satisfy the requirement of an extraordinary change
in circumstances. The party seeking the change should be required
to show that the child's present environment causes some actual
harm to the child. The manner in which custody was first estab-
lished should not affect the requirement.
The Carney court reaffirmed its commitment to two major poli-
cies in change of custody cases: protecting the child from unnecessary
changes in their living situation and ending litigation.179 However,
the court did not set out clear guidelines to effect these policies, and
appellate court reversals in child custody cases have not been
uncommon. 180
An extraordinary change in circumstances requirement would
provide judges with a more objective standard to guide their deci-
sions. Moreover, the proposed requirement would help prevent cus-
tody changes based on outdated stereotypes. An actual harm require-
ment would serve the best interests of the child because it would
make it more difficult to take the child from its present home. This
would help guarantee continuing contact between the child and the
primary caretaker. 8 '
The requirement of an extraordinary change in circumstances
would ensure that the policy objectives of the California Legislature
and the Carney court would be implemented. The Legislature's at-
tempt to give greater recognition to behavioral science research
would be satisfied because of the recognition that the child's con-
tinuity with its primary caretaker is paramount. The Carney court's
policy considerations of bringing an end to litigation and allowing
the child's environment to remain stable would be advanced by this
proposal because parents would be able to predict the outcome of
178. Krom, supra note 28, at 156-57.
179. 24 Cal. 3d at 730-31, 598 P.2d at 38, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
180. See supra note 128.
181. GO.DSrEIN, supra note 93, at 31-34.
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custody disputes. Judges would also have clear guidelines when de-
ciding these cases and reversals would be less common.
The extraordinary change in circumstances requirement would
also decrease discrimination against single working mothers by limit-
ing judicial discretion. It would promote a sex-neutral custody deter-
mination because it favors the parent who has been the primary
caretaker. A stricter standard would also protect the custody rights of
fathers.18
B. Adopt a Primary Caretaker Presumption
In its current form, the best interests of the child standard is too
vague to guide judges when they decide which parent should have
custody of the children. Custody cases are the most difficult family
law cases for trial court judges to decide, and 'judges need clear
guidelines to help them.188 Therefore, California should establish a
presumption favoring the primary caretaker for all custody disputes
between natural parents where the child is of tender years.184 The
presumption is sex-neutral; it gives preference to the parent who has
provided the primary care for the child. This standard would com-
port with modern understanding of the child's best interests.
The primary caretaker presumption can be objectively verified
by judges by listing duties connected with child rearing and estab-
lishing which parent performed those duties. 8' If the parents shared
equal responsibility for raising the child, the presumption would not
apply.
Adopting the primary caretaker presumption would decrease
acrimonious litigation over who is the better parent. Costs to the
parties would also be reduced because the need to rely on experts
would be decreased. 8 If the primary caretaker is a single mother,
182. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362-63.
183. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 63, at 38.
184. The presumption would not apply in a dispute such as between a natural parent
and a natural grandparent.
185. In Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363, the court noted the following factors in determining
who provided the primary care for the child:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing,
cleaning and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5)
arranging for social interaction among peers after school, i.e., transporting to friends' houses
or, for example, to girl or boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e. baby sitting,
day care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of the night,
waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e., teaching general manners and toilet train-
ing; (9) educating, i.e., religious, cultural, social, etc.; (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., read-
ing, writing and arithmetic.
186. Id. at 362.
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she would not be as tempted to sacrifice needed child support in or-
der to gain custody. 187 A clear standard would also decrease the
amount of time judges spend deciding each case.
Under the primary caretaker presumption, the parent with the
best record of providing for the child's needs will be awarded custody
in most cases. This would truly serve the best interests of the child.
The primary caretaker presumption would limit the judge's dis-
cretion to use economic factors and traditional lifestyle preferences.
This presumption would reduce discrimination against single work-
ing mothers and would provide a clear standard on appeal.
C. Judicial Notice
In order to provide for the equitable and consistent disposition
of cases involving a change in child custody, judicial notice should be
taken of the potential discrimination that has been recognized in
other jurisdictions following the abrogation of the tender years pre-
sumption. Judicial notice should also be taken of the child's need for
a stable and continuous relationship with its primary parent.
The recognition by the court of the change in the family struc-
ture would reduce discrimination against single working mothers be-
cause it would bring current social realities to the attention of judges
who may inadvertently apply outdated biases for a traditional fam-
ily. The recognition of the child's need for stability and continuity
would decrease the adverse effects experienced by children due to
court ordered changes in their environment.
D. Recommendations to Attorneys
Until the California Supreme Court takes judicial notice of the
way broad discretion affects single working mothers in custody modi-
fication cases, attorneys representing mothers bear the responsibility
of informing the court about the effects of changing social realities on
their clients. Information on contemporary family life and current
behavioral science research is readily available. 8 8 Even if trial courts
are not persuaded by these arguments, the information would be
part of the record on appeal. The family law bar can help its clients
and the efficiency of the legal system by focusing the court's attention
on the essential components of a child's welfare: the need for love
and continuing contact with the primary caretaker.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 72-100 and accompanying text.
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VI. CONCLUSION
When the California Legislature eliminated the tender years
presumption in 1972, it took a giant step toward ending sex discrim-
ination in custody disputes. However, eliminating the presumption
without providing explicit guidelines has allowed trial judges to base
custody decisions on factors that are not related to the best interests
of the child. The use of outdated factors also reinforces sex-role ste-
reotypes which discriminate against both mothers and fathers.
Establishing a primary caretaker presumption in conjunction
with an extraordinary change of circumstances requirement in cus-
tody modification cases will reduce litigation and will help avoid up-
setting the child's stable home environment and connection with the
primary caretaker. Most important, these measures will serve the
best interests of the children:
We have heard it said that beyond nourishing food, clothing and
shelter, children need little further that is material. But their
needs of the spirit, including love and just treatment, although
simple, are absolute. If these needs are not met, and we deprive
them of the consideration and justice they deserve, nothing else
can serve in their place. On the other hand, if these needs are
met, nothing else matters.189
Charles N. Trudrung-Taylor
189. Fain, supra note 64, at 37.
]EDITOR's NOTE: The Burchard v. Garay case discussed throughout this comment was
subsequently decided by the California Supreme Court. 42 Cal. 3d 531, __ P.2d -,
- Cal. Rptr. - (1986). The court, in an opinion by Justice .Broussard, held that the
trial court had correctly used the best interest of the child standard and had correctly refused to
apply the changed circumstances rule because there had been no prior custody decision. Al-
though the correct standard was used, the court reversed the trial court decision because the
trial court erred in applying that standard. The "relative economic position" of the parties
should not be analyzed, and continuity and stability of custody should weigh heavily in the
decision. 42 Cal. 3d at 535, - P.2d at __, - Cal. Rptr. at _ . Further, the court
stated that the trial court's "reliance upon the asserted superiority of William's child care
arrangement [with constant care by the child's stepmother] suggests an insensitivity to the role
of working parents." Id. This decision directly supports the analysis set forth by the author of
this comment.]
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